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Multinational firms are known to shift profits and countries are known to compete over shifty 
profits. Two major principles for corporate taxation are Separate Accounting (SA) and 
Formula Apportionment (FA). These two principles have very different qualities when it 
comes to preventing profit shifting and preserving national tax autonomy. Most OECD 
countries use SA. In this paper we show that a reduction in trade barriers lowers equilibrium 
corporate taxes under SA, but leads to higher taxes under FA. From a welfare point of view 
the choice of tax principle is shown to depend on the degree of economic integration. 
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The rise in FDI and multinational ﬁrm activity is one of the most pronounced
trends in the world economy over the last two decades.1 This trend has
worried policymakers and academics, since multinationals are known to shift
proﬁts to low tax countries and governments are prone to compete for shifty
proﬁts.2 In response to these problems the European Commission has focused
on ”harmful” tax competition (as in the ”Monti Package”), and has more
recently published a study on corporate taxation. The latter study aims at
ﬁnding a system for corporate taxation that prevents proﬁts h i f t i n g ,r e d u c e s
compliance costs for ﬁrms, and preserves national tax autonomy (Commission
of the European Communities, 2001).
One of the main proposals emerging from the Commission’s corporate tax
study is a switch from the corporate tax system employed by most European
countries - called Separate Accounting (SA) - to a system of Formula Appor-
tionment (FA). Apportionment systems are already in use internally among
states, provinces, and cantons in federal countries such as the United States,
Canada, and Switzerland, where its introduction has been motivated by the
need to disentangle the activities of state subsidiaries from the activities of
multistate enterprises as a whole in order to secure a tax base in all states
where the enterprise has ongoing activities.
Under Separate Accounting (SA) taxable income of a corporation’s ac-
tivity in each jurisdiction is based on computing the value of transactions
between related aﬃliates as if they had occurred by independent parties in
the market place (so called arm’s length pricing). The obvious weakness of
this system is that it can be diﬃcult to obtain market parallels on which
such prices can be established. In particular, there is substantial evidence
that Multinational Corporations (MNCs) arise because they possess ﬁrm-
speciﬁca s s e t st h a ta r ei n t a n g i b l ei nn a t u r ea n dd i ﬃcult to trade at arm’s
length (Markusen (1995)). In practice, multinationals therefore have signiﬁ-
1See Markusen (ch. 1, 2002).
2The proﬁt shifting activities of MNCs are well documented. Grubert and Mutti (1991),
Hines and Rice (1994), Harris et al. (1993), and Collins, Kemsley and Lang (1998) study
U.S. data and ﬁnd strong evidence in support of proﬁts h i f t i n gt ol o wt a xc o u n t r i e s .
Broader data are analyzed by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2001) who ﬁnd evidence for tax
avoiding transfer pricing in most OECD countries. For Europe Weichenrieder (1996)
shows that German ﬁrms have shifted proﬁts to the manufacturing sector in Ireland,
thereby taking advantage of the low Irish tax rate. For a survey of this literature, see
Hines (1999).
2cant discretion when setting their transfer prices. The competing alternative
to SA, Formula Apportionment (FA), implies that the corporate group com-
bines the income of each of its operatives into a single measure of taxable
income. The group then uses a formula to apportion taxable income to each
of the jurisdictions in which the group has activities.3 The advantage of this
approach is that manipulation of income between aﬃliates by use of trans-
fer prices does not have an impact on the single measure of income for the
corporate group.
Given the growing importance of multinationals worldwide and the at-
tention by policymakers to the issue of company taxation, it is perhaps sur-
prising that very little work has been done to compare separate accounting
to formula apportionment. Our objective in this paper is to undertake such
a comparison in a framework that also allows us to investigate the impact of
economic integration on tax policy, the choice of corporate tax system, and
welfare.
Our paper relates to a small literature that has mainly addressed cor-
porate tax competition in the presence of multinational ﬁrms and transfer
pricing under SA.4 Konan (1996) models strategic taxation policy of home
and host governments under SA when a multinational enterprise sets trans-
fer prices on globally joint inputs. She ﬁnds that an equilibrium home-tax
solution is to tax foreign earned proﬁts at a higher rate than domestically
earned proﬁts. In Elitzur and Mintz (1996) the transfer price takes on a
dual role aﬀecting both the amount of proﬁts shifted and incentives for the
subsidiary’s managing partner. Using a framework of separate accounting
governments compete over MNC proﬁts and impose corporate income taxes
subject to a rule that approximates what the government believes is the
arm’s length price. In the tax competition equilibrium tax rates are aﬀected
by home country production costs, agency costs, and the productivity of
the subsidiary, and it is shown that tax harmonization is likely to reduce
tax rates. Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000) analyze the optimal taxation of
multinational proﬁts under SA when ﬁrms can shift proﬁts between countries
3In the United States, for example, some of the states that levy a corporate income
tax determine taxable income within their state on the basis of the state’s shares of the
corporation’s total property, payroll and sales.
4Related are Janeba (1995, 1996) and Konan (1997) who study social welfare eﬀects of
multinational enterprise taxation under SA in relation to double taxation treaties and FDI.
Neither of these papers, however, considers transfer pricing nor the impact of economic
integration on policy.
3by transfer pricing. They consider a setting where countries compete over
corporate proﬁts by choosing both the tax rate and the tax base (deprecia-
tion allowances) simultaneously. They ﬁnd that recent corporate tax reforms
in the OECD where corporate tax rates have been reduced while the tax
base has been broadened, are optimal responses to the increased presence of
multinationals and transfer pricing.5
Studies that compare the welfare or revenue eﬀects of a switch from SA
to FA are scant.6 Slemrod and Shackelford (1998) examine ﬁnancial reports
from U.S. based multinationals for the period 1989-1993 to estimate the
revenue implications of implementing a U.S. federal formula apportionment
system. They ﬁnd that a switch from SA to FA using an equal three-weighted,
three factor formula would have increased US tax liabilities by 38 percent.
Nielsen et al (1999) use a two-country setup to compare SA to FA. In their
model each MNC consists of a parent ﬁrm in one country and a subsidiary in
the other. Both the parent ﬁrm and its subsidiary produce an output using
a public input and (plant-speciﬁc) capital, and the public input is acquired
by the parent company and made available to the subsidiary at a (transfer)
price. They ﬁnd that if the pure proﬁts of multinationals are either very low
or very high, and at the same time the costs of engaging in transfer pricing are
of intermediate size, a switch from SA to FA reduces tax revenue and welfare.
Finally Anand and Sansing (2000) show that a harmonized apportionment
rule can prevail as the cooperative solution to a game between states (as can
a system under SA), but a state can increase its welfare by deviating from
the cooperative solution. This incentive gives rise to a Prisoner’s Dilemma
type of problem under FA. We emphasize that none of the papers reviewed
above focuses on economic integration (taken to imply a reduction in trade
costs) and transfer pricing, nor on how the interaction between the two may
aﬀect tax competition and the choice of tax system.
Our analysis is related to Nielsen et al (1999) in the sense that we study
the eﬀect of competition over corporate proﬁts in the presence of multination-
als and transfer pricing. Diﬀerent from their analysis (and previous studies)
is that the transfer price applies to a traded commodity that can only be
5There is also a small literature studying the regulation of transfer prices under SA
when countries compete for corporate proﬁt (see Mansori and Weichenrieder (2001) and
Raimondos-Møller and Scharf (2002)).
6Separate papers by Gordon and Wilson (1986), McLure (1987), and Mintz (1999)
study distortions under FA. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) provide evidence for negative
externalities between jurisdictions under FA.
4shipped to the subsidiary at a (trade) cost. This allows us to analyze the
impact of economic integration. Furthermore, we also take into account the
fact that the transfer price as well as being a tax saving device gives rise to
strategic eﬀects.7 The latter is in contrast to the traditional literature on
transfer pricing where monopoly is most often assumed. Under oligopoly, it
has been shown by Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997) for SA and by Nielsen et
al (2003) for FA that transfer prices trade oﬀ tax incentives against strate-
gic incentives. The strategic role of the transfer price is similar to the role
of export (or import) subsidies (taxes) in strategic trade policy models (see
e.g. Brander, 1985), but with the diﬀerence that the transfer price can be
used either as a proﬁt shifting device or as a strategic trade instrument. The
strategic eﬀect of the transfer price is as follows: if aﬃliates of an MNC face
oligopolistic competition, the MNC can gain by setting the transfer price of
internationally traded goods at a central level and delegating decisions about
quantities (or prices) to its local aﬃliates. Such a strategy is beneﬁcial to
the MNC as a whole if it triggers favorable responses by local competitors.
For example, under Cournot competition, a low transfer price set by the
headquarters, turns the importing aﬃliate into a low cost ﬁrm that behaves
aggressively by selling a large quantity. Such aggressive behavior induces the
local rival to behave softly by setting a low quantity.8 T h es o f tr e s p o n s ef r o m
the rival is beneﬁcial to the MNC as a whole. Hence, delegation can achieve
higher proﬁts than would arise if all decisions were undertaken centrally. The
implication is that the transfer price has a strategic value in addition to being
an instrument for proﬁts h i f t i n g . F u r t h e r m o r e ,s i n c ei ti st h eh e a d q u a r t e r s
of the MNC that conducts trade policy, the chosen transfer price is both
credible and consistent with international trade agreements.
To sum up, this paper diﬀers from previous studies in that it analyzes
how economic integration aﬀects equilibrium tax rates, transfer prices and
national welfare under SA and FA. Another novelty of the analysis is that
w ea l l o wt r a n s f e rp r i c e st ot a k eo nad u a lr o l ei nt h es e n s et h a tt h e ya r eb o t h
tax saving and strategic devices in markets with oligopolistic competition.
We show that the transfer price is relatively tax sensitive for a high degree of
7The strategic role of the transfer price has been observed in the car industry and the
petroleum industry. In the car industry it is often the case that the headquarters of the
MNC determines the export price on cars, but delegates decisions about the ﬁnal price of
the car to its subsidiary.
8The opposite result would be true under price competition (i.e., a high transfer price
would be preferable - see Schjelderup and Sørgard 1997).
5economic integration under SA, while the opposite is true under FA. Hence,
the conventional wisdom in the tax competition literature that increased eco-
nomic integration leads to lower tax rates is supported by our ﬁndings under
SA. However, under FA where increased integration reduces the tax sensi-
tivity of the transfer price, increased competition over shifty proﬁts allows
governments to levy higher tax rates. A basic message that emerges from our
a n a l y s i si st h e r e f o r et h a tf r o maw e l f a r ep o i n to fv i e wt h ec h o i c eo fs y s t e m
for corporate taxation hinges on the level of economic integration.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider two countries, 1 and 2, which are identical in all respects. Each
country is host to the headquarters of a multinational corporation, and the
headquarters commands two plants, one in each country. The plant located
in i produces quantities xii and xij with zero unit costs (the ﬁrst subscript
indicates where the headquarters is located and the second where sales occur).
The assumption of zero unit costs is made for the sake of technical simplicity,
and does not aﬀect results qualitatively.9 Quantity xii is sold in country i
at a price pi, while quantity xij is exported to the aﬃliate in country j at a
transfer price gi a n dr e s o l di nt h a tc o u n t r ya tp r i c epj. A positive gi implies
that the transfer price is higher than the marginal cost of production, while
an e g a t i v egi signiﬁes underinvoicing. The inverse demand functions faced
by the ﬁrms are given by
pi = α − β (xii + xji),i =1 ,2,i6= j. α,β > 0. (1)
Proﬁts before tax for the MNC’s domestic (πii) and foreign (πij)p l a n t sa r e
respectively,
πii = pixii + gixij − C(gi),
πij =[ pj − gi − τ]xij, i =1 ,2,i6= j. (2)
where τ denotes trade costs and C(gi)=δg2
i is a concealment cost of transfer
pricing, with δ ≥ 0. The higher the value of δ, t h em o r ee x p e n s i v ei ti sf o rt h e
ﬁrm to deviate from the true production costs when it sets the transfer price.
This assumption can be interpreted as costs related to concealing the true
9A proof of this is obtainable from the authors upon request.
6nature of the transaction by making it harder to compare the two products
across markets (for example by incurring costs related to the use of lawyers,
and/or accountants, see, e.g., Hauﬂer and Schjelderup, 2000). If it is not
costly to shift proﬁts, transfer pricing may imply that one of the plants ends
up with negative proﬁts (πii < 0 or πii < 0). It is reasonable to assume that
such transfer pricing would not go undetected by the governments. In order
to ensure non-negative proﬁts for each plant, we conﬁgure the concealment
cost function so that proﬁts by the parent ﬁrm are non-negative. This can
b es h o w nt oh o l di fδ =1 /(9β), where β > 0. Note, however, that all our
results are robust to changes in δ a n dd oa l s oh o l de v e ni nt h ec a s eo fδ =0 .10
The transfer price is set by a central authority within the multinational
ﬁrm (to be called the headquarters), which maximizes global after tax prof-
its. The headquarters delegates decisions about quantities to its aﬃliates.
Hence, the plants are independent decision makers which maximize before
tax proﬁts with quantity as their strategic variable. In what follows, we study
a three-stage game in which quantities, transfer prices, and tax rates are en-
dogenously determined. The structure of the game is as follows: At the ﬁrst
stage the two governments choose tax rates simultaneously, and at the second
stage the headquarters of each MNC sets the transfer price to maximize total
after tax proﬁts of the corporation, taking into account how tax payments
should be minimized globally. Finally, at the third stage there is quantity
competition between plants in each country. Solving the game backwards,
we start at the third stage, which is independent of the tax system.
Before we proceed, we would like to comment on why we assume in the
third stage of the game that the aﬃliates maximize proﬁt before tax rather
than after tax. Under SA economic proﬁt equals taxable proﬁt so maximiza-
tion of pre-tax and after-tax proﬁt yields the same outcome. However, under
FA economic proﬁtd i ﬀers from taxable proﬁt. Thus, if each aﬃliate max-
imizes after-tax proﬁt, a tax distortion arises, which gives each aﬃliate an
incentive to reduce the apportionment weight that determines its tax pay-
ment. This opens up for a game between aﬃliates of the same multinational
ﬁrm, where each aﬃliate wants to minimize its tax apportionment weight
(i.e., its relative activity level in proportion to the total activity level of the
multinational as a whole). Such a game does not seem very plausible. Fur-
thermore, maximization of after tax proﬁtb ye a c ha ﬃliate may result in the
10For a proof: see
http://www.nhh.no/sam/res-publ/supplements/AppendixKMS.pdf.
7payment of too much tax by the multinational as a whole, since each aﬃliate
disregards how its tax saving actions aﬀect the tax payments of related aﬃli-
ates. Consequently, we make the more realistic assumption that the aﬃliates
maximize before tax proﬁt, while the headquarters uses the transfer price to
maximize global after tax proﬁts under both SA and FA.
3 The three stage game
3.1 Stage 3: Quantity competition
At the third stage, the domestic and the foreign plant of each MNC maximize
before-tax proﬁts in the two segmented markets in countries 1 and 2, and set
quantities. Equilibrium quantities at the third stage are given by
xii =
α + τ + gj
3β
,x ij =
α − 2(τ + gi)
3β
. (3)
From (3) it follows that the transfer price set by MNCi does not aﬀect
its domestic sales, that is, ∂xii/∂gi = ∂xjj/∂gj =0 . However, an increase in








From (4) we see that a marginal increase in the transfer price gi reduces
the foreign plant’s sales by 2/(3β) units, and increases the local competi-
tor’s sales by 1/(3β) unit. The transfer price thus introduces a fundamental
asymmetry on sales in diﬀerent markets; it has no eﬀect on domestic sales,
but is negatively correlated to sales abroad. Qualitatively the transfer price
has the same eﬀect on sales abroad as an export subsidy set by the home
government; it increases the home ﬁrm’s market share abroad (see Brander,
1995). In the next sections we investigate transfer pricing and tax policy
under Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment.
3.2 Stage 2: Optimal transfer prices
Under delegation of authority, headquarters choose the transfer price in or-
der to maximize after-tax global proﬁts. From (3) we know that a change in
8the transfer price inﬂuences the competitive behavior of the aﬃliates of the
multinational ﬁrm. The idea of delegation, well known from the Industrial
Organization literature, is that it may give the aﬃliates a strategic advantage
that beneﬁts the corporation as a whole (see e.g. Sklivas, 1987 and Fersht-
mann and Judd, 1987). Since each headquarters maximizes global proﬁts
after tax, we start this section by deriving the full expressions for after-tax
global proﬁts under SA and FA.
Separate Accounting Under Separate accounting each country imposes
a tax on the proﬁts generated within its borders. The aim of the tax code is
to identify the precise receipts and expenditures attributable to the corpora-
tion’s activities in each jurisdiction. Although repatriated proﬁts in principle
are taxed in the country of residence, there is general agreement that due
to deferral possibilities and limited tax credit rules, the source principle of
taxation is eﬀectively in operation (Keen, 1993, and Tanzi and Bovenberg,
1990). Taking this into account, global after tax proﬁts of a multinational
ﬁrm with headquarters in country i are
Π
SA
i =( 1− ti)πii +( 1− tj)πij,i =1 ,2. (5)
Formula Apportionment Under Formula Apportionment (FA) the tax
liability of a multinational corporation is apportioned to each country based
on the activities of the MNC in each country relative to the MNC’s world-
wide activities.11 I ng e n e r a l ,t h eF As c h e m em a yu t i l i z ei n f o r m a t i o no nt h e
relative stock of capital employed in each country, relative sales, and/or rel-
ative payroll. For simplicity we consider only a simpliﬁed version here, in
which the activity measure is revenue from sales.




i =[ ( 1− ti)Si +( 1− tj)(1− Si)]πi, (6)
where Si ≡ pixii/(pixii + pjxij) and πi ≡ πii + πij.
11The FA system is currently used in the US, Canada, and Switzerland.
9Optimal transfer price The optimal transfer price under SA and FA is
found by computing how a marginal change in gi aﬀects global after tax
proﬁts (i.e., the eﬀect on (5) and (6)), taking into account the fact that
the plants take transfer prices as given (i.e., by using (3) in the ﬁrst order
condition for the headquarters).
The transfer price potentially serves two purposes in this model; it can
be used as a strategic trade instrument and as an instrument to reduce tax
payments if the countries have diﬀerent tax rates. The strategic incentive
is best seen by setting ti = tj ≡ t, in which case the multinationals would
set the same transfer price (g1 = g2 ≡ g) under both tax regimes (see the













The fact that the transfer price is set below marginal cost of production (g<
0) means that the headquarters subsidizes exports to its foreign aﬃliate. Such
a pricing strategy turns the foreign aﬃliate into a low-cost ﬁrm that behaves
aggressively by increasing its sales in the foreign market. The response of
the competing local ﬁrm is to scale down its sales, thus allowing the foreign
aﬃliate to capture a larger share of the market. From (7) we further see
that increased economic integration in the form of reduced trade costs lowers
the transfer price. A reduction in trade costs enhances the proﬁtm a r g i no f
foreign sales, and thus increases the volume and proﬁtability of foreign sales.
Economic integration, therefore, means that it becomes more attractive to
use the transfer price as a strategic device.
The easiest way to see how the multinationals can possibly use the transfer
price as a tax reducing instrument, is to assume that we initially have ti =
tj ≡ t, a n dt h e nt oc o n s i d e rt h ee ﬀect of a marginal increase in one of the
















Equation (8) reﬂects the fact that under the SA tax regime the multinationals
will use the transfer price to shift proﬁt to the country with the lower tax
rate.
12The transfer price in equation (7) is always negative, since trade will only take place
if a>2τ.
10Under FA the multinationals pay taxes according to their relative activity
levels Si and (1−Si)i nt h et w oc o u n t r i e s ,a ss h o w nb ye q u a t i o n( 6 ) .T h i sg i v e s
them an incentive to have the higher activity level in the low-tax country.
Hence, the multinationals use the transfer price to shift activity from country
i to country j if ti increases (and vice versa if tj increases). In the Web-




















where the derivative ∂Si/∂gi is positive, since a higher transfer price reduces
export and thus increases the ratio between domestic sales and total sales for
the ﬁrm.
To sum up, equations (8) and (9) make it clear that, under both tax
regimes, an increase in the tax rate of country i reduces the transfer price
set by the MNC with headquarters in country i, while an increase in the tax
rate of country j increases the same MNC’s transfer price.
3.3 Stage 1: Optimal tax rates
At the ﬁrst stage each government sets the tax rate in order to maximize
national welfare (W), taking the tax rate of the other country as given. For
simplicity, we assume that the multinational ﬁrms are owned by third country
residents. This means that welfare equals the sum of consumer surplus (CS)
and tax income (T).
Each government’s welfare maximization problem is







,k = SA,FA (10)




(α − pi)(xii + xji). (11)
The equilibrium tax rates are determined through the countries’ competi-
tion for tax revenue. The tax competition game between the two governments
is qualitatively diﬀerent under the two tax regimes we consider. Under SA
the multinationals want to shift proﬁt to a (possible) low-tax jurisdiction,
as shown by equation (8). This generates an incentive for the governments
11to compete for shifty proﬁt. Under FA, on the other hand, the governments
compete to attract sales revenue, since the multinationals want to shift the
larger share of their activity to a low-tax jurisdiction (c.f., equation (9)).13
Technically, the derivation of the optimal tax rates is found by maximizing
welfare subject to the reaction functions of the plants and the headquarters
from stages 3 and 2, respectively.




i = ti(πii + πji). (12)
Solving the governments’ maximization problem we derive the optimal tax
rate ti = ti (tj,τ). A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by t ≡ t1 = t2,
and using the symmetry condition yields (see the Web-Appendix for deriva-
tion):
t
SA =m i n
½
1,
−4α2 +7 9 ατ +1 0 1 τ2
3(88α2 − 355ατ +4 3 9 τ2)
¾
(13)
Before investigating the impact of reduced trade barriers on the tax rate, we
derive the equilibrium transfer price and tax rate under FA.
Formula Apportionment A si nt h ec a s eo fS A ,t h eg o v e r n m e n tm a x -





. The expression for consumer surplus is
given by (11) as before, while tax revenue under FA equals
T
FA
i = ti [Siπi +( 1− Sj)πj]. (14)
In a similar fashion as under SA, we ﬁrst solve for the optimal tax rate ti
a n dt h e nu s et h es y m m e t r yc o n d i t i o nt1 = t2. This gives the equilibrium tax
rate (see the Web-Appendix for calculations):
t
FA =
2(19α − 20τ)(13α − 8τ)
3
84281α4 − 225760α3τ +2 9 66 8 8 α2τ2 − 358144ατ3 + 512000τ4.
(15)
In the next section we study the implications of economic integration on
transfer prices, equilibrium tax rates, and national welfare under Separate
Accounting and Formula Apportionment.
13Whether we use output or sales revenue as activity measure does not inﬂuence the
qualitative results. A proof of this is obtainable from the authors.
124 Economic integration, tax regimes and wel-
fare
In order to understand how economic integration aﬀects tax rates and welfare,
we need to explore the link between trade costs, transfer prices, and tax rates.
First, recall from equation (7) that the transfer price is the same under SA
and FA if ti = tj. However, the sensitivity of the transfer price with respect to
changes in the tax rates is qualitatively diﬀerent under the two tax regimes.
In particular, the tax sensitivity is higher the lower the level of trade costs
































To see the intuition for equation (16), assume that there is a small increase in
tj from the symmetric equilibrium. The higher tax rate in country j implies
that MNCi has an incentive to shift proﬁts to country i by increasing the
transfer price, and this incentive is stronger the greater is the proﬁtm a r g i n
of exports. Since the proﬁt margin is higher the lower the level of trade
costs, the tax sensitivity of the transfer price rises as economic integration
proceeds. Conversely, if ti increases, MNCi shifts sales to the foreign aﬃliate
by underinvoicing. The greater the proﬁt margin of exports (i.e. the lower
is τ), the stronger the incentive to underinvoice. Hence, under SA economic
integration increases the proﬁt shifting activities of MNCs and thereby the
tax sensitivity of national tax bases.
Under Formula Apportionment, the relationship between transfer pric-
ing, tax sensitivity, and trade costs is the opposite of that under SA. A tax
sensitive transfer price implies that the MNC can easily shift proﬁts to the
low tax country. The ease with which the MNC can shift proﬁts under FA
depends on the eﬀect of a change in the transfer price on the apportionment
of tax liability across countries. If the foreign aﬃliate’s share of total sales —
due to high trade costs — is small initially, a given change in gi has a large
eﬀect on the (relative) share of sales abroad, since the increase in foreign
13sales starts from a very low level. On the other hand, for low levels of trade
costs, the foreign aﬃliate’s share of total sales is quite large, and the relative
share of sales will therefore not change signiﬁcantly in response to a change
in the transfer price. The lower the trade costs, the smaller the tax gain from
changing the transfer price, and the relatively less sensitive is the transfer
price to changes in either tax rate. This explains the sign of equation (17).
The impact of economic integration on equilibrium tax rates is a function
of the tax sensitivity of the transfer prices. Formally, the relationship between
trade costs and equilibrium tax rates is found by diﬀerentiating tSA and tFA
in equations (13) and (15), respectively, with respect to τ. The analytical
















Figure 1: Equilibrium tax rates and economic integration; SA versus FA.
Figure 1 shows that equilibrium tax rates under SA are lower, the lower
the level of trade costs. From (16) we know that under SA economic inte-
gration makes the transfer prices more tax sensitive and therefore increases
the mobility of the tax base. This puts a downward pressure on tax rates as
trade costs are reduced.14
14This result is similar to the standard tax competition result, see e.g., Zodrow and
Mieszkowksi (1986), Wildasin (1988), and Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991).
14Economic integration has a very diﬀerent implication under FA. As seen
from Figure 1 the relationship between trade costs and equilibrium taxes is
the opposite under FA: a reduction in trade costs leads to higher tax rates.
Recall that transfer prices under FA are less tax sensitive the lower the level
of trade costs (cf. (17)). Consequently, economic integration reduces the
eﬀectiveness of the transfer price as an instrument for proﬁts h i f t i n ga n d
lowers the tax sensitivity of the national tax base, thereby allowing each
country to increase its tax rate.
The implication of diﬀerences in the tax sensitivity of the transfer prices
under the two tax regimes is that there exists a level of trade costs where tax
rates are equal (see the Web-Appendix for a formal proof). In Figure 1 this
is illustrated by the fact that tFA >t SA for τ < τ∗ and tFA <t SA for τ > τ∗.
Welfare The eﬀect of increased economic integration on equilibrium taxes
and tax revenue depends on the choice of tax regime as is illustrated in
Figure 2. Recall that we have shown that the transfer price in equilibrium is
independent of the choice of tax regime (c.f. (7)). This in turn implies that
consumer surplus and taxable proﬁt in equilibrium proﬁt are also independent
of the tax regime in place. Thus, the tax regime that yields the higher tax
rate (and revenue) will also yield the higher welfare. Since we know that
the tax rate under SA is lower than the tax rate under FA if and only if
τ < τ∗, it follows that welfare under FA is higher than under SA for τ < τ∗.
To sum up, Separate Accounting is preferred for high levels of trade costs,
while Formula Apportionment is preferable for low levels of trade costs.15
15To make a full welfare assessment of the eﬀect of economic integration, one needs to
take into account the fact that trade liberalization reduces consumer prices. This explains
the non-monotonic form of the SA welfare curve; economic integration increases consumer













Figure 2: Welfare comparison; SA versus FA
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper has demonstrated that the transfer price of multinationals is rel-
atively tax sensitive for high degrees of economic integration under separate
accounting. Separate accounting is the corporate tax system used by most
OECD countries. In contrast, the transfer price is not very tax sensitive
for closely integrated countries under a formula apportionment tax system,
w h i c hi su s e di nt h eU S Aa n dC a n a d a ,a n dp r o p o s e db yt h er e c e n tE UC o m -
mission report on corporate taxation.16 These ﬁndings are mirrored in the
welfare analysis, where we ﬁnd that a system of formula apportionment (sep-
arate accounting) dominates for high (low) degrees of economic integration.
Thus, the choice of corporate tax system depends crucially on the perceived
degree of economic integration, and our ﬁndings give support to the view
brought forward by many other economists that increased economic integra-
tion may call for a substantial reform of the corporate tax system.17
16European Commission (2001a). Company taxation in the internal market. Commis-
sion Staﬀ. Working SEC (2001) 1681 Brussels.
17See, e.g. Musgrave (1973), Bird and Brennan (1986), McLure (1989), Bucks and
Mazerov (1993) and Shakelford and Slemrod (1998).
16In our model we have made a number of simplifying assumptions, two
of which we would like to discuss in more detail. The ﬁrst relates to trade
costs, where we have assumed that it is the foreign subsidiary that pays
these expenses. An alternative formulation is to let the exporting plant pay
the trade costs. Everything else being equal, the importing plant is more
competitive (has lower costs) when it does not pay trade costs. This implies
that the transfer price needs not be set as low as in the case when the
importing plant pays the trade costs. The alternative modelling assumption
thus amounts to a scaling of the transfer price that does not qualitatively
aﬀect the tax sensitivity of transfer prices under SA and FA, nor our welfare
analysis.18
The second simplifying assumption refers to the use of tax revenues.
Would our results change if we allowed tax revenues to be used for pub-
lic good production? Our analysis shows that tax revenues diﬀer under SA
and FA and a reasonable conjecture is therefore that this diﬀerence would
be reﬂected in diﬀerences in the provision of public goods under the two tax
schemes. For public consumption goods one would not expect our results to
change qualitatively, but if there is decreasing utility from consuming public
goods, the relative beneﬁt of one scheme to the other would be less pro-
nounced. If instead tax revenue could be used to enhance the productivity
of ﬁrms, one would expect, depending on the cross derivative between pri-
vate and public input goods, that the preference for one tax scheme would
increase. However, the main thrusts of our arguments should survive, but
this is an obvious topic for future research.
18A proof is obtainable from the authors upon request.
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